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5 February 1951

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for G/30

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State  
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State  
Mr. James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. James Q. Maher, Central Intelligence Agency

1. The discussion centered around two subjects:
  - a. Detailed area research necessary for briefing of G/30 operatives and preparation of questions for collection by the operatives, and
  - b. The relationship of what is known generally as International Communism on the one hand and Communist Party apparatus on the other, and where the responsibility for research and evaluation in this field or fields should be located.
2. Responsibility for the receipt of G/30 requirements on Point a. above and for the securing of research production from the appropriate part of the Government and for the collation of the results should be in the Central Intelligence Agency because the subject matter is one of common concern to almost all the departments of Government but this work cannot be done unless it is fully backed by the authority and full support of the Director of Central Intelligence. It was Mr. Angleton's view that this would have to be outside of G/30 (the best location is probably in G/RR).
3. With respect to Point b. above Angleton felt that it was not possible to state where political, economic and other aspects of the problem can be isolated in CIA (or whatever agency may be charged with the problem). It is quite possible that the overt side of the study should be a State Department responsibility but the results of what is obtained and the raw material wherever obtained by secret contacts should be given to the authority charged with the problem. It was agreed by Stelle and Angleton that International Communism and so-called CP apparatus were inseparable. Mr. Evans wished to explore further the possibility of a separation. Mr. Evans and Mr. Stelle were considerably impressed by Mr. Angleton's view that the aggressive analysis of International Communism and the CP apparatus was of major importance. Problems presented by the normal understandable reluctance of security agencies, including G/30, to provide results of their research

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and long experience could hardly be overcome by placing of this responsibility in any of the departmental intelligence agencies but rather would require the authority and full support of the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. With respect to Point a. above, Reber undertook to pursue this subject further with Mr. Millikan and report back to the participants of this discussion. With respect to Point b. above, Angleton, on the part of his Assistant Director, undertook to prepare a paper fully explaining his ideas and Evans undertook to set forth a reasoning with respect to the pros and cons of either separation of this broad subject of International Communism, or recommendations for the centralized research on the subject.

5. The subjects of Biographical intelligence and evaluation for C/SD were laid aside for consideration at another time.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Assistant Director,  
Intelligence Coordination

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Mr. Evans  
Mr. Stelle  
Mr. Angleton  
Mr. Millikan  
Mr. Kirkpatrick



Mr. Dulles

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